Loose Lending In The Construction Industry — Andrew Sutherland

Andrew Sutherland

MIT Sloan Assistant Professor Andrew Sutherland

From Construction Today

Lax mortgage lending by banks has long been recognized as a major cause of the financial crisis. But banks played another, lesser-known role in the crisis. In much the same way that banks failed to verify the creditworthiness of people buying homes, banks also neglected to verify financial qualifications of those building homes — developers, contractors and other firms in the construction industry.

I, along with fellow researchers Petro Lisowsky of the University of Illinois and Michael Minnis of the University of Chicago, discovered this phenomenon by examining previously unreleased banking industry data on borrowers and lenders from 2002 to 2011 — a span that includes the years before, during, and after the financial crisis. We compared the lending standards banks used for firms in the construction industry with the standards banks applied to firms in other industries.

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The board’s role in share repurchases – Robert Pozen

MIT Sloan Senior Lecturer Robert Pozen

MIT Sloan Senior Lecturer Robert Pozen

From MIT Sloan Management Review

Capital allocation is a significant function for company directors. How much of the company’s profits gets reinvested in the business rather than distributed to shareholders through cash dividends or share repurchases is a critical decision companies must make. Boards of directors typically approve a dividend policy and precise amounts for each quarter: Everyone knows that cutting the dividend will result in a sharp decline in the share price.

Yet in many companies, decisions about the level and timing of share repurchases are left to management. That stems partly from differences in legal requirements: The board must formally approve the amount of the company’s quarterly dividend but not its repurchases. Moreover, the implementation of the repurchase program is heavily influenced by the company’s actual cash flows.

Nevertheless, share repurchases are something to which directors should pay more attention. Specifically, directors should carefully consider the capital allocated to repurchases relative to the company’s realistic opportunities for value creation through internal development or external acquisitions. They should be highly skeptical of large repurchase programs that are financed by selling debt rather than paid for out of company profits.

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Opinion: your future financial adviser could be a robot – Vasant Dhar & Roger M. Stein

MIT Sloan Researcher Roger Stein

MIT Sloan Researcher Roger Stein

From MarketWatch

President Donald Trump has vowed to bring manufacturing jobs back to the U.S. through new policies and regulatory reform. But this effort faces a strong headwind: In all walks of life, human employment is being challenged.

Many manufacturing jobs have been replaced by robots. Meanwhile, drivers are on their way to being displaced by driverless cars, tax professionals by software, and much more.

Recently Trump turned his attention to the financial services industry, signing two directives aimed at repealing portions

NYU Professor Vasant Dhar

of the Dodd-Frank and Consumer Protection acts, citing onerous restrictions that hamper legitimate investing and financial activity.

But regulatory change isn’t likely to repel the march of the robots that is transforming the financial services business. FinTech — the finance industry equivalent of robots in manufacturing — is too far along for that. If future investors and consumers of financial services begin to trust FinTech platforms as they have done in retail and travel, then fewer humans will be working in finance.

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Easing this bank lending rule could spur small business growth – Andrew Sutherland

Andrew Sutherland

MIT Sloan Assistant Professor Andrew Sutherland

From MarketWatch

Small firms and startups are often referred to as the “engine” of the U.S. economy because of their ability to create new jobs. For example, firms with fewer than 500 employees accounted for 63% of net new U.S. jobs created between 1992 and 2013.

Yet despite their importance to the economy, small firms often face difficulties accessing bank financing. These firms are typically opaque — that is, they don’t attract media or analyst attention, or produce lengthy financial reports. As a result, banks cannot rely on public information to assess loan applications from small firms. Instead, the firms must provide the bank with information demonstrating their creditworthiness. This process can be cumbersome and expensive for small firms.

In many cases, a bank can avoid imposing onerous reporting requirements on a firm by relying on its experience lending to similar firms from the industry or community to make loan approval decisions. In theory, this arrangement can make it easier for small firms to get credit.

Yet regulators pressure banks to collect more documentation from their largest exposures — precisely those areas where the bank has the greatest experience — a policy that can work to the disadvantage of small firms.

For example, a bank that has expertise in lending to small manufacturing companies might be the best able to access lending risk, and therefore make the soundest lending decisions on new businesses in this sector. But the bank’s expertise works against it since regulators require banks with heavy concentrations of loans in certain industries to collect even more documentation.

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Decoding CEO Pay – Robert Pozen & S.P. Kothari

MIT Sloan Senior Lecturer Robert Pozen

MIT Sloan Senior Lecturer Robert Pozen

From Harvard Business Review 

Each year most public companies issue reports on the pay packages of their top executives, describing how their compensation committees arrived at the numbers. These reports are part of the proxy statements sent to all shareholders, who vote on the packages. The votes are advisory or binding, depending on the country where a company is chartered.

More than 95% of the time, shareholders overwhelmingly approve the pay recommendations. Yet our research suggests that investors should be more skeptical. Compensation committees frequently adjust company performance numbers in complex and

MIT Sloan Professor SP Kothari

even obscure ways, for a variety of reasons. Sometimes, for example, they want to focus on the performance of a company’s core or continuing operations. Whatever the motive, the upshot is all too often inflated numbers, calculated on a nonstandard basis, that rationalize overly generous compensation.

Given that reality, compensation committees need to explain the basis of their decisions more clearly in their reports. For their part, investors need to develop standards and best practices for compensation design and reporting, around which they can build a meaningful dialogue with companies. Such a dialogue is critical today in view of the public’s concerns over the rising ratio of CEO pay to the average worker’s wages and of shareholders’ growing insistence that high pay be justified by superior managerial performance.

In this article we’ll review the common shortcomings of compensation committee reports, especially the use of nonstandard accounting measures and the selection of inappropriate peer companies. We’ll also propose ways in which companies and shareholders can improve their approach to determining top management’s compensation. Let’s begin by looking at an example of the problem.

Generous to a Fault

In their reports, most compensation committees identify the criteria used to award both annual cash bonuses and longer-term stock grants—usually the two largest components of executive pay. But even at the most upstanding companies, those criteria are seldom well explained.

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