The British vote to leave the European Union has shaken world financial markets. The immediate and medium-term prospects for economic growth in the United Kingdom are severely diminished, and the impact on the rest of Europe will be negative.
Some of the obvious political winners from Brexit are people who do not like Western Europe and what it stands for. Ironically, the United States — Europe’s greatest ally and the EU’s largest trading partner — may also end up as a beneficiary, though not if Donald Trump, the presumptive Republican nominee, wins the presidential election in November.
Britain has a population of just over 65 million people and what was, at least until Thursday, the world’s fifth-largest national economy, with annual GDP totaling nearly $3 trillion. In the context of a $75 trillion global economy, Britain’s is a relatively small, open one that relies heavily on foreign trade — annual exports are typically in the range of 28%-30% of economic activity.
We usually think of ethnic diversity as a matter of social policy, not a factor that could impede market bubbles. But new research by me and a team of colleagues suggests a surprising new reason to consider diversity as a hedge against speculative bubbles: in two studies, we find that markets comprised of ethnically diverse traders are more accurate in pricing assets than ethnically homogeneous ones. Our paper, which came out Nov. 17 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS), finds that ethnic diversity leads all traders, whether of majority or minority ethnicity, to price more accurately and thwart bubbles. The reason isn’t because minority traders had special information or differential skills; rather, their mere presence changed how everyone approached decision-making. Traders were more apt to carefully scrutinize others’ transactions and less likely to copy others’ errors in diverse markets, and this reduced the incidence of bubbles.
To conduct our research, we constructed experimental markets in the United States and Singapore in which participants traded stocks to earn real money. We randomly assigned participants to ethnically homogenous or diverse markets. We found that markets comprised of diverse traders did a 58 percent better job at pricing assets to their true value. Overpricing was higher in homogenous markets because traders are more likely to accept speculative prices, we found. Their pricing errors were more correlated than in diverse markets. And when bubbles burst, homogenous markets crashed more severely.
The market for corporate control is staggeringly large. In 2007 alone, the value of M&A transactions in the world was $4.8 trillion. Even in the wake of the economic crisis, it’s still a very active market with many complex features.
One of these features is the type of bidders involved in a corporate takeover auction. They fall into two categories: Strategic bidders such as competitors who are looking for long-term operational synergies, and financial bidders such as private equity firms and divisions of investment banks. Financial bidders are looking for financial synergies as well as for undervalued companies with the potential to improve operations.