Why long-tenured CEOs fail? The case of Nissan – Egor Matveyev

Visiting Assistant Professor of Finance, Egor Matveyev

From Nikkei Business Online

When is it time to get a new CEO? This is the question that every board of directors asks – or at least has to ask – itself every year when evaluating performance of their CEOs. While we know that CEOs get fired for really bad performance, most of the time performance is not bad enough to justify such a drastic measure. On top of that, what are the guarantees that the new CEO will be any better? Therefore, the default choice is to stick with the current CEO.

If we could identify who is a good CEO and who is a bad one, then replacement decisions would be easier. But in practice, it is a very difficult task. In my recent work with co-authors, we tried to address this question. We use state-of-the-art methodology and a large sample of CEOs to identify who is good and who is bad. Of all possible predictors of CEO quality, three factors emerged to have the strongest predictive power. These factors are CEOs’ age, tenure, and founder status. In our study, we define young CEOs as those whose age is below 58 and old CEOs as those whose age is above 65. Short-tenured CEOs are those who have been in the office for less than 8 years, and long-tenured – above 18 years. (These cutoffs – 58 and 65 for age, and 8 and 18 for tenure – are tercile breakpoints for age and tenure in our sample.)

We find that young CEOs tend to be good on average. They account for more than 4% of the market value of their firms. This means that if they leave, firm value drops by 4% on average. On the other hand, old and long-tenured CEOs tend to be bad. They destroy more than 3% of firm value, which means when they leave, firm value rises by as much as 3%. Among founder-CEOs, the age and tenure effects are even stronger. Young founders account for almost 9% of firm value, while old and long-tenured founders destroy more than 5%. These differences are striking. Our study is the first one to document such strong and heterogeneous age and tenure effects.

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Decoding CEO Pay – Robert Pozen & S.P. Kothari

MIT Sloan Senior Lecturer Robert Pozen

MIT Sloan Senior Lecturer Robert Pozen

From Harvard Business Review 

Each year most public companies issue reports on the pay packages of their top executives, describing how their compensation committees arrived at the numbers. These reports are part of the proxy statements sent to all shareholders, who vote on the packages. The votes are advisory or binding, depending on the country where a company is chartered.

More than 95% of the time, shareholders overwhelmingly approve the pay recommendations. Yet our research suggests that investors should be more skeptical. Compensation committees frequently adjust company performance numbers in complex and

MIT Sloan Professor SP Kothari

even obscure ways, for a variety of reasons. Sometimes, for example, they want to focus on the performance of a company’s core or continuing operations. Whatever the motive, the upshot is all too often inflated numbers, calculated on a nonstandard basis, that rationalize overly generous compensation.

Given that reality, compensation committees need to explain the basis of their decisions more clearly in their reports. For their part, investors need to develop standards and best practices for compensation design and reporting, around which they can build a meaningful dialogue with companies. Such a dialogue is critical today in view of the public’s concerns over the rising ratio of CEO pay to the average worker’s wages and of shareholders’ growing insistence that high pay be justified by superior managerial performance.

In this article we’ll review the common shortcomings of compensation committee reports, especially the use of nonstandard accounting measures and the selection of inappropriate peer companies. We’ll also propose ways in which companies and shareholders can improve their approach to determining top management’s compensation. Let’s begin by looking at an example of the problem.

Generous to a Fault

In their reports, most compensation committees identify the criteria used to award both annual cash bonuses and longer-term stock grants—usually the two largest components of executive pay. But even at the most upstanding companies, those criteria are seldom well explained.

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MIT Sloan Management Review: Sustainability contributing to company profits

Through a global survey conducted by MIT Sloan Management Review and The Boston Consulting Group, we sought to determine where exactly sustainability sits on the management agendas of the more than 2,800 companies.  It turns out that it’s prominent: more than two-thirds of companies have placed sustainability permanently on their management agenda.

Our study also found that two-thirds of companies see sustainability as necessary to being competitive in today’s marketplace, up from 55% a year earlier.  In addition, two thirds of respondents said management attention to, and investment in, sustainability has increased in the last year.

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Asst. Prof. Andrey Malenko: Types of Bidders are Key Factor in Corporate Takeovers

MIT Sloan Asst. Prof. Andrey Malenko

The market for corporate control is staggeringly large. In 2007 alone, the value of M&A transactions in the world was $4.8 trillion. Even in the wake of the economic crisis, it’s still a very active market with many complex features.

One of these features is the type of bidders involved in a corporate takeover auction. They fall into two categories: Strategic bidders such as competitors who are looking for long-term operational synergies, and financial bidders such as private equity firms and divisions of investment banks. Financial bidders are looking for financial synergies as well as for undervalued companies with the potential to improve operations.

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