MIT Sloan Assistant Professor, Accounting Delphine Samuels
From The Hill
It’s widely assumed that executives are less likely to inflate their earnings when they work at high profile companies that operate under a good deal of regulatory oversight.
Yet it’s also widely known that managers in high-profile companies face tremendous pressure from investors to meet or beat Wall Street estimates every quarter, which incentivizes them to overstate their company’s performance.
How should policymakers looking to curb accounting fraud reconcile these countervailing forces? My colleagues —Daniel J. Taylor and Robert E. Verrecchia, both at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School — and I set out to answer that question. Read More
MIT Sloan Assistant Professor Andrew Sutherland
The passage of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) was big news for public companies, but there was little discussion or analysis about what it meant for private firms, nonprofits and governmental entities. Yet those nonpublic entities needed to purchase accounting services from the same pool of independent auditors. It turns out that shocks to public companies from SOX significantly affected supply for the entire audit services market.
In a recent study, my colleagues and I looked at these developments and found that SOX had several negative spillover effects for nonpublic entities. Overall, audit fee increases for nonpublic entities more than doubled. Many others were forced to switch to a different auditor.
Why is this a big deal if those groups aren’t legally required to hire independent auditors? It’s important because nonpublic entities still have substantial financial reporting needs. For example, organizations use audits to establish payments plans with vendors and suppliers or to demonstrate creditworthiness to banks. Charities use audits to show they are responsibly spending donors’ money.
Here is a breakdown of the spillover effects: Read More
MIT Sloan Senior Lecturer Robert Pozen
From Real Clear Markets
Senator Orrin Hatch, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, is focusing on an important aspect of the agenda for corporate tax reform — — allowing U.S. corporations to receive a deduction for dividends paid to their shareholders. That deduction would eliminate double taxation of corporate profits distributed as dividends; instead, these profits would be taxed only to shareholders, not at both the shareholder and corporate levels.
Although Senator Hatch has not disclosed the details of his proposal, a corporate deduction for dividends paid has several advantages. But such a proposal would raise financial and political challenges that would have to be addressed.
MIT Sloan Prof. Michelle Hanlon
From The Wall Street Journal
Apple issued $12 billion of U.S. debt in April, which gave the company a domestic cash infusion that allowed it to keep more earnings overseas. Last month Pfizer PFE attempted to acquire AstraZeneca, a transaction that would have made Pfizer a subsidiary of the U.K.-based company. These were useful examples in the taxation classes I teach at MIT’s business school, but the real-world implications of these decisions are troubling. Even worse, legislators have responded with proposals that seek to prevent companies from escaping the U.S. tax system.
The U.S. corporate statutory tax rate is one of the highest in the world at 35%. In addition, the U.S. has a world-wide tax system under which profits earned abroad face U.S. taxation when brought back to America. The other G-7 countries, however, all have some form of a territorial tax system that imposes little or no tax on repatriated earnings.
To compete with foreign-based companies that have lower tax burdens, U.S. corporations have developed do-it-yourself territorial tax strategies. They accumulate foreign earnings rather than repatriate the earnings and pay the U.S. taxes. This lowers a company’s tax burden, but it imposes other costs.
For example, U.S. corporations hold more than $2 trillion in unremitted foreign earnings, a substantial portion of which is in cash. This is cash that currently can’t be reinvested in the U.S. or given to shareholders. As a consequence, companies are borrowing more in the U.S. to fund domestic operations and pay dividends. Another potential effect is that companies invest the earnings in foreign locations.
MIT Sloan Deputy Dean S.P. Kothari
From WSJ MarketWatch
Since the onset of the global financial crisis in 2007-08, the administration and the Federal Reserve have implemented policies explicitly designed to spur investment, grow GDP, and reduce unemployment. These actions haven’t worked — certainly not as expected.
The weapons of choice to boost the U.S. economy have been low interest rates, deficit spending, and increased money supply through the Fed’s balance-sheet expansion to over $3 trillion. Yet almost five years later, GDP growth has been anemic at below 2% and at times negative, and aggregate domestic investment is about where it was in 2004, and considerably below the 2006-2007 level.
Optimists believe it’s still too early and that we have spent too little. More of the same would eventually produce good fortune — at least, that’s the hope.
S.P. Kothari is deputy dean and professor of accounting at the MIT Sloan School of Management. He is the author, with Jonathan Lewellen and Jerold Warner, of ”The Behavior of Aggregate Corporate Investment”.